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Abstract. Very recently, the concept of Traceable Identity-based En-
cryption (IBE) scheme (or Accountable Authority Identity based En-
cryption scheme) was introduced in Crypto 2007. This concept enables
some mechanisms to reduce the trust of a private key generator (PKG)
in an IBE system. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we discuss
some subtleties in the first traceable IBE scheme in the Crypto 2007 pa-
per. Second, we present an extension to this work by having the PKG’s
master secret key retrieved automatically if more than one user secret
key are released. This way, the user can produce a concrete proof of mis-
behaviour of the PKG in the court. In contrast to previous approach,
our idea gives strong incentive for the PKG to strengthen the security
of the system since if someone can successfully release a user’s secret
key, it means that his security is also compromised. We present a formal
model to capture our idea. Third, we present an efficient construction
based on Gentry’s IBE that satisfies our model and prove its security.
Our construction is proven secure in the random oracle model. Never-
theless, we should emphasize that the aim of this paper is to introduce
the new model to strengthen the IBE system.
Keywords: Identity-based Encryption, Traceability, Retrievability, PKG, Trust.
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The idea of identity-based encryption (IBE) was put forward by Shamir in his
seminal paper in [1]. The main concept was proposed in 1984, whilst the first
practical and fully functional IBE scheme was only proposed in [2] that takes
advantage of the properties of suitable bilinear maps (the Weil or Tate pair-
ing) over supersingular elliptic curves. Since then, many new schemes have been
proposed in the literature (including the recent one by Gentry [3]). The main
essence of IBE is to remove the necessity of public key certification, that is re-
quired in the conventional public key cryptography setting. The public key of
each participant is obtained from his/her public identity, such as email address,
IP address combined with a user name, social security number, etc. that can
uniquely identify the participant. Furthermore, the sender can send his cipher-
text to a recipient without requiring the receiver to have his public key setup
first. Indeed, the secret key can be retrieved later after the receiver receives the
ciphertext sent by the sender. Unfortunately, this model requires the existence
of a trusted authority called the Private Key Generator (PKG), whose task is
to generate user’s private key from their identity information, after a successful
identification.
In an IBE system, the PKG is completely trusted, and therefore the PKG
has the liberty to engage in any malicious activity without any risk of being sent
to court. To mitigate this trust problem, a distributed PKG was proposed [2].
Very recently, Goyal [4] presented a new idea to reduce the trust of the PKG.
His idea is to produce an exponential (or super-polynomial) number of possible
decryption keys corresponding to every identity. The PKG does not know which
secret key that has been chosen by the user. Therefore, when the PKG releases
one of the possible user’s secret keys, then the user can later show two different
secret keys as his proof of the PKG misbehaviour. Goyal formalized this notion
as a traceable identity-based encryption scheme [4] (This notion was renamed to
Accountable Authority Identity-based Encryption (A-IBE) in [5]).
Nonetheless, we believe that traceable IBE is not very useful for achieving the
purpose of deterring the PKG from distributing private keys for any identity. The
reason is that in practice, it is difficult for a user to win a court if the user sues
the PKG. This is because the PKG can always put a disclaimer well in advance
for mitigating the liability of the PKG. Another reason is that the damage is
externality with respect to the PKG, rather than the PKG itself. Therefore,
there is no strong incentive for the PKG to secure its own system. We therefore
motivate ourselves with an additional mechanism which can help discourage the
PKG from distributing private keys for any identity while encouraging the PKG
to strengthen the security of its own system.
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Our Contributions
We take one step forward than Goyal’s idea in reducing the trust on the PKG.
Our idea is to have the PKG’s master secret key retrieved automatically if more
than one user secret key are released. This way, the user can produce a concrete
proof of misbehaviour of the PKG in the court. In contrast to Goyal’s approach,
our idea also gives some benefit to the PKG to strengthen their security system as
if someone can successfully release a user’s secret key, it means that his security
is also compromised. Therefore, it is also the PKG’s interest to ensure its security
of the system (c.f. Goyal’s approach [4]).
In this paper, firstly we point out some subtleties in Goyal’s work [4,5]. More
specifically, there are some subtleties in instantiating the ZK-POK sub-protocol
in the first traceable IBE scheme provided in [4,5] and we propose a suggestion on
how to efficiently instantiate it. Furthermore, we observe that several definitions
used in Goyal’s work are not formally defined. Hence, the model provided in
Goyal’s work is incomplete. We present a formal model to capture our idea
mentioned above with the aim of reducing the trust on the PKG. We deal with
this part in two stages. Firstly, we formally define the parts that are lacking
from Goyal’s work. Then, we add an algorithm called Retrieve that is used to
output the master secret key given two different user’s secret keys. We call this
notion as a Traceable and Retrievable Identity-based Encryption scheme. Second,
we present an efficient construction based on Gentry’s IBE [3] that satisfies our
model.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 3, we present some security
remarks on Goyal’s work [4,5]. In Sec. 4, we present the formal model of Traceable
and Retrievable IBE. We present a concrete construction based on Gentry’s IBE
in Sec. 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. 6.
2 Preliminaries
Notations
Let e be a bilinear map such that e : G1 ×G2 → G3.
– G1 and G2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
– each element of G1, G2 and G3 has unique binary representation.
– g, h are generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
– (Bilinear) ∀x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab.
– (Non-degenerate) e(g, h) 6= 1.
G1 and G2 can be the same or different groups. We say that two groups
(G1, G2) are a bilinear group pair if the group action in G1, G2 and the bilinear
mapping e are all efficiently computable.
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Complexity Assumptions
The security of our concrete construction is based on a complexity assumption
called “truncated decision q-ABDHE assumption” proposed in [3] which is de-
fined as follows:
Let e : G×G→ GT be a bilinear map, where G and GT are cyclic groups of
large prime order p. Given a vector of q + 3 elements:(
g′, g′
(α)q+2
, g, gα, g(α)
2
, . . . , g(α)
q)
∈ Gq+3
and an element Z ∈ GT as input, output 0 if Z = e(g(α)
q+1
, g′) and output 1
otherwise.
An algorithm B has advantage ε in solving the truncated decision q-ABDHE
if: ∣∣ Pr[B(g′, g′(α)q+2 , g, gα, . . . , g(α)q , e(g(α)q+1 , g′)) = 0]
−Pr[B(g′, g′(α)
q+2
, g, gα, . . . , g(α)
q
, Z) = 0]
∣∣ ≥ ε
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g, g′ in G, the
random choice of α in Zp, the random choice of Z in GT , and the random bits
consumed by B.
The computational version of the assumption is defined in the natural way,
where the term Z is asked as the output.
Definition 1. We say that the truncated decision (t, ε, q)-ABDHE assumption
holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ε in solving the truncated
decision q-ABDHE problem in G.
3 On Goyal’s Scheme [4]
In this section we analyze some subtleties in Goyal’s paper [4]. These subtleties
are mainly about the instantiation of ZK-POK sub-protocol and the FindKey
game. We also make some comments on Goyal’s definition of Traceable IBE.
First of all, we review Goyal’s first traceable IBE scheme below.
3.1 Review of Goyal’s First Traceable IBE Scheme
Goyal’s first scheme [4] is built on top of Gentry’s IBE scheme [3]. The basic cryp-
tosystem (Setup, Encryption and Decryption) are taken from Gentry’s scheme
[3]. The only difference between Goyal’s scheme and Gentry’s scheme relies on
the Key Generation Protocol, which is an interactive protocol between a user
U and the PKG. For completeness, we review the Setup and Key Generation
Protocol as follows.
Let G be a bilinear group of large prime order p and let g be a generator of G.
Additionally, let e : G×G→ GT denote a bilinear map. A security parameter,
k, will determine the size of the groups.
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Setup. The PKG picks random generators g, h1, h2, h3 ∈ G and a random α ∈ Zp.
It sets g1 = gα and then selects a hash function H from a family of universal
one-way hash function. The published public parameters PK and the master
key MK are given by
PK = {g, g1, h1, h2, h3,H}, MK = α
Key Generation Protocol. This protocol will allow a user U to securely obtain
a decryption key dID from PKG. As in [3], PKG aborts if ID = α. The key
generation protocol is as follows.
1. The user U selects a random r ∈ Zp and sends R = hr1 to the PKG.
2. U gives to PKG a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the discrete log of
R with respect to h1.
3. The PKG now selects three random numbers r′, rID,2, rID,3 ∈ Zp. It then
computes h′ID,1 = (Rg
−r′)1/(α−ID) and hID,i = (hig−rID,i)1/(α−ID), i ∈ {2, 3}
and sends
{r′, h′ID,1, rID,2, hID,2, rID,3, hID,3}
to the user U .
4. U computes rID,1 = r′/r and hID,1 = (h′ID,1)
1/r. It sets the decryption key
dID = {(rID,i, hID,i) : i ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
5. U now runs a key sanity check on dID as follows. It computes gα−ID = g1/gID
and checks if e(hID,i, gα−ID)
?= e(hig−rID,i , g) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. U aborts if the
check fails for any i.
At the end of this protocol, U will have a well-formed decryption key dID for the
identity ID.
3.2 Comments on the Instantiation of ZK-POK
In the above scheme, a user runs a Key Generation Protocol, which is a zero
knowledge proof of knowledge (ZK-POK), with the PKG to jointly generate
his/her secret key, without letting the PKG know which key was actually gener-
ated. In this protocol, the user first randomly selects R and then proves to the
PKG that he/she knows the discrete log of R with respect to base h1. We believe
that the Key Generation Protocol is correct. However, there are some subtleties
in instantiating the ZK-POK sub-protocol. Goyal suggested to employ Schnorr’s
3-round identification scheme [6] as the underlying ZK-POK, which is an honest-
verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The revised and extended version
[5] does not discuss much about the instantiation either. Proof systems proposed
in [7] may not fit the Key Generation Protocol, as they merely concentrate on
honest verifiers as well. It turns out that efficient instantiations of ZK-POK is
not a very trivial task as one may originally think. Below are the subtleties in
the instantiations.
In the proof of Theorem 2 in [4], after receiving the challenge R from its
challenger, the adversary B, who wishes to solve the discrete log problem, runs
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the simulator to prove the knowledge of the discrete log of R with respect to
base h1 (by rewinding A who tries to win the FindKey game). Note that in the
proof, B and A play the roles of the simulator and the verifier, respectively. The
simulator S for Schnorr’s protocol does not need to rewind the (honest) verifier
in order to provide a transcript indistinguishable from that of a real interaction.
It even does not need to interact with the verifier during the simulation at all,
since the verifier is assumed to be honest, and S can select a random challenge
on behalf of the verifier. But in the case here, B has to interact with A in order
to provide an indistinguishable simulation, thus it has to rewind A to gain some
advantage for the simulation. However, there is only one possible way for B to
rewind A. That is, after receving the challenge c from A, B rewinds A back to
the initial state at the beginning of the zero-knowledge proof, and sends A a
new first-round message a, which is computed based on the challenge c obtained
from A. Now, if A sends back the same c, then the simulation can be completed
successfully. However, there is no guarantee on that A would do so, since A’s
status is changed. In a consequence, B cannot use S to provide a zero-knowledge
proof desired by A without the knowledge of logh1 R. Hence, A may not win the
FindKey game with probability ε again.
An oversimplified way to fix the problem is to let verifier V commit itself
to its challenge first before prover P sends its first message. P sends its final
response only if V reveals the commitment correctly. It is easy to see that the
resulting protocol is zero-knowledge against arbitrary verifier, however, it does
not seem to be a proof of knowledge.
A better instantiation of the ZK-POK is to use the efficient 6-round ZK-POK
of [8] (which can further be compressed into 4 rounds). The verifier V commits
to its challenge and proves to P that he knows the challenge. After that P proves
to V that he knows either the challenge or the discrete log. Readers can refer to
[8] for details.
We emphasize here again that the above comments do not imply that Goyal’s
scheme is problematic. Instead, they are regarding to efficient instantiations of
the ZK-POK sub-protocol.
3.3 Comments on the Definition of [4]
We also notice that the definition for Traceable IBE given by Goyal in [4] is
incomplete and imprecise. Comparing with conventional IBE definition [2], a
Traceable IBE scheme described in [4] additionally requires the user to do a
“sanity check” on the “well-formedness” of an extracted user secret key from the
PKG. However, the meaning of “sanity check” of a user secret key in association
with that of “well-formedness” have never been formalized.
Since the PKG is no longer trusted fully in the setting of this research work,
the user secret key generated by the PKG using Extract Protocol may be mal-
formed. In this scenario, it is possible that this malformed key can still decrypt
a portion of all possible ciphertexts for the user but not all. Now if the malicious
PKG publishes another user secret key which can decrypt all the ciphertexts for
the user, the user will not be able to win a court if the user provides these two
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keys as evidence to a court of law, claiming that the PKG is cheating. This is
because the PKG can show that one of the keys presented by the user is not a
valid key since it cannot decrypt all possible ciphertexts.
Therefore, we believe that the notion of “sanity check” has to be formalized.
In addition, in the subsequent security model, we also need to formalize the
intuition that a user should be provided with a method to make sure that the
user secret key extracted from the PKG via Extract Protocol can always be able
to decrypt ciphertexts for the user.
Also due to the lack of “sanity check” definition in [4], the security model
of [4] is also incomplete. The attack scenario described above is not captured in
any of the models specified in [4].
4 Traceable and Retrievable IBE
4.1 TR-IBE Model
A Traceable and Retrievable Identity-Based Encryption (TR-IBE) scheme con-
sists of six probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms and one two-party
interactive protocol.
Setup. On input 1k where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it outputs a master
public/secret key pair (mpk, msk).
Extract Protocol. The Private Key Generator, PKG, on input (mpk, msk, ID)
carries out the protocol with a user on input (mpk, ID). At the end of the proto-
col, the user outputs a user secret key uskID or a symbol ⊥ indicating the failure
of the protocol run. Formally, the PKG and the user in the protocol are consid-
ered as PPT Turing machines. Without loss of generality, we let ID ∈ {0, 1}k.
In practice, the user with identity ID may send the identity to the PKG in the
first message flow of the protocol.
SanityCheck. On input (mpk, ID, uskID), it outputs 1 or 0.
Enc. On input (mpk, ID,m), where m is a message from a message space M
defined by mpk, it outputs a ciphertext C.
Dec. On input (mpk, uskID, C), it outputs m ∈M or a symbol ⊥ if the decryp-
tion fails.
Trace4. On input (mpk, ID, uskID), it outputs ⊥ if SanityCheck(mpk, ID, uskID) 6=
1. Otherwise it outputs a user key family number fnID from a user key family
number space denoted by FID. This space is defined by (mpk, ID).
Retrieve. On input (mpk, ID, uskID, ũskID), it outputs the master secret key msk
or a symbol ⊥ indicating the failure of retrieval.
4 Trace is needed for some technical reason. It is used for formalizing the user key family
number and will mainly be used in the Retrievability Game described on page 10.
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For correctness, we require that for all k ∈ N, for any (mpk, msk)← Setup(1k),
any identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k, any uskID 6= ⊥ output by the user with identity ID at
the end of a run of Extract Protocol with the PKG, any m ∈M(mpk), we have
1. 1← SanityCheck(mpk, ID, uskID);
2. m← Dec(mpk, uskID,Enc(mpk, ID,m)); and
3. Trace(mpk, ID, uskID) ∈ FID.
4.2 Security Model for TR-IBE
In [4], three games have been given for formalizing the following three security
notions.
1. Confidentiality of Ciphertexts: a conventional indistinguishability based game
capturing chosen ciphertext and identity attacks, namely IND-ID-CCA simi-
lar to that in [2] is given.
2. Secrecy of User Secret Key Against Malicious PKG: the PKG, after carrying
out a successful run of Extract Protocol with a user, should not be able to
find out the user key family number of the user secret key obtained by the
user.
3. Security Against Framing by Malicious Users: a user should not be able to
come up with two user secret keys such that the corresponding user key
family numbers are different, after at most one execution of Extract Protocol
with the PKG.
As explained in Sec. 3.3, an additional security notion related to “sanity check”
of user secret key should be introduced. We also introduce the security notion
“Retrievability” which is specific to the retrievability property of TR-IBE. It
can be seen that the security against framing by malicious user in TR-IBE is
implied by the requirement of confidentiality of ciphertexts and the retrievability
property. If the adversary is able to come up with two user secret keys, he can
compute the master secret key of PKG due to the retrievability property and is
able to break the confidentiality of ciphertexts of all users. In the following, we
formalize all these security notions. The corresponding games are Confidentiality
(IND-ID-CCA) Game, FindKey Game, SanityCheck Game and Retrievability Game.
Confidentiality (IND-ID-CCA) Game. On input a security parameter 1k, k ∈ N,
the following game is carried out by a simulator S against an adversary A.
1. S generates (mpk, msk)← Setup(1k) and invokes A on mpk. S maintains a
list L. Initially, L is set to empty.
2. A (which acts as a user) may execute Extract Protocol with S (which acts as
the PKG) on any identity ID or query a decryption oracle ODec on (ID, C).
For each run of Extract Protocol, if ID ∈ L, S rejects the protocol run imme-
diately5. Otherwise, the protocol is carried out. At the end of a successful
5 This restriction is natural as if A were allowed to run Extract Protocol on an ID for
multiple times, due to the retrievability property of TR-IBE, msk may be compro-
mised.
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run, S sets L := L∪ {ID}. For an ODec query, S generates a user secret key
by simulating Extract Protocol and uses it to decrypt the querying ciphertext.
3. A submits two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ M(mpk) and an identity
ID∗ to S. If ID∗ ∈ L, S aborts. Otherwise, S flips a random coin b R← {0, 1}
and sends C∗ ← Enc(mpk, ID∗,m∗b) to A. S sets L := L ∪ {ID}.
4. A can continue executing Extract Protocol and querying ODec. At the end
of the game, A outputs its guess b′ of b.
A wins if b′ = b and (ID∗, C∗) has never been queried to ODec. The advantage
of A in this game is defined as Pr[A wins]− 12 .
In the following, we give the formal definition of “Secrecy of User Secret Key
Against Malicious PKG”. In Sec. 4.3, we will see that it is stronger than the one
given in [4].
FindKey Game. On input a security parameter 1k, k ∈ N, the following game
is carried out by a simulator S against an adversary A.
1. S maintains two lists L1 and L2, both of them are initialized to null. S
invokes A on 1k and gets mpk from A.
2. A (acts as the malicious PKG) may execute Extract Protocol with S (which
acts as a user) on any identity ID chosen by A. If ID ∈ P (L1) ∪ L2, S
rejects the protocol run immediately, where P (L1) is the collection of the
first elements of all the pairs in L1. At the end of a successful run, suppose
the user secret key generated is uskID. If SanityCheck(mpk, ID, uskID) = 1, S
sets L1 := L1 ∪ (ID, uskID).
3. Since A (which acts as the malicious PKG) may collude with some users in
this multi-user setting (see Sec. 4.3 for more details), A is allowed to access
an oracle called OCorrupt. On input ID, if (ID, uskID) ∈ L1 for some user
secret key uskID, the oracle returns uskID, and sets L1 := L1 \ {(ID, uskID)}
and L2 := L2 ∪ {ID}. Otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
4. At the end of the game, A outputs an identity ID∗ and a user secret key
ũskID∗ .
A wins if
1. 1← SanityCheck(mpk, ID∗, ũskID∗);
2. (ID∗, uskID∗) ∈ L1; and6
3. Trace(mpk, ID∗, uskID∗) = Trace(mpk, ID∗, ũskID∗).
The advantage of A in this game is defined as Pr[A wins].
We now formalize the notion related to “sanity check”. As discussed in
Sec. 3.3, a user should be provided with a method to make sure that the user
secret key extracted from the PKG via Extract Protocol can always be able to
decrypt ciphertexts for the user. We consider the following game. Informally, it
6 Note that we do not need the restriction that ID∗ 6∈ L2 as ID∗ cannot co-exist in
both L1 and L2.
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requires that for any two user secret keys of an identity that passed the “sanity
check”, both of them will always produce the identical result in decryption.
SanityCheck Game. On input a security parameter 1k, k ∈ N, a simulator S
invokes an adversary A on 1k. A returns a master public key mpk, an identity
ID∗, two user secret keys uskID∗ and ũskID∗ and a ciphertext C. A wins if
1. 1← SanityCheck(mpk, ID∗, uskID∗);
2. 1← SanityCheck(mpk, ID∗, ũskID∗);
3. ⊥6= Dec(mpk, uskID∗ , C);
4. ⊥6= Dec(mpk, ũskID∗ , C); and
5. Dec(mpk, uskID∗ , C) 6= Dec(mpk, ũskID∗ , C).
The advantage of A in this game is defined as Pr[A wins]. By combining the
notion captured in this game and the correctness requirement defined at the
beginning of Sec. 4, it is easy to see that the intuition of “sanity check” is
captured.
The last security notion, also the only one specific to “Retrievability” prop-
erty, requires that for any two user secret keys corresponding to the same identity
but with different user key family numbers, they allow the public to retrieve the
master secret key. The following game considers a malicious PKG which tries
to come up with two user secret keys such that its master secret key is not
retrievable.
Retrievability Game. On input a security parameter 1k, k ∈ N, a simulator S
invokes an adversary A on 1k. A returns a master public key mpk, an identity
ID∗, and two user secret keys uskID∗ and ũskID∗ . A wins if
1. 1← SanityCheck(mpk, ID∗, uskID∗);
2. 1← SanityCheck(mpk, ID∗, ũskID∗);
3. Trace(mpk, ID∗, uskID∗) 6= Trace(mpk, ID∗, ũskID∗); and
4. ⊥ ← Retrieve(mpk, ID∗, uskID∗ , ũskID∗).
The advantage of A in this game is defined as Pr[A wins].
Theorem 1. A TR-IBE scheme is said to be secure if for all polynomial time
adversaries, the advantage in each of the Confidentiality game, FindKey game,
SanityCheck game and Retrievability game is negligible in the security parameter
k.
4.3 Further Comments on the Security Model of [4]
The FindKey Game defined in [4] is weaker than our model defined above. In
particular, the game in [4] requires the adversary to fix the challenging identity
ID∗ at the beginning of the game and no further change is allowed. Also, the ad-
versary is not allowed to interact with other identities. In our definition instead,
we allow the adversary to “try out” and also corrupt a couple of identities in the
manner of adaptive chosen identity attack before choosing a challenging identity
at the end of the game.
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5 A Concrete Scheme
5.1 Construction
High Level Description. Our scheme is based on Gentry’s IBE scheme [3].
We extend the scheme by adding a Verifiable Encrypton (VE) scheme [9]. The
PKG has two sets of public key pair. One is for the IBE and the other for the
VE. At the beginning, the PKG verifibly encrypts, using its VE public key, the
(IBE) master secret key. The encrypted master secret key is published. In the
key extraction process, one addition component is given to the user as the secret
key. This component allows the revocation of the encrypted master secret key.
That is, if the PKG generates two secret keys (they may be different) for the
same user, by using these two secret keys, the master secret key can be decrypted
and revoked.
Technical Details.
Setup: On input 1k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter, let G and GT be
groups of order p such that p is a k-bit prime, and let e : G × G → GT be the
bilinear map. We use a multiplicative notation for the operation in G and GT . Let
HI : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, Ht : {0, 1}∗ → Zp be secure cryptographic
hash functions. The PKG selects four random generators g, h1, h2, h3 ∈ G and
randomly chooses α, β, x ∈R Zp. It sets g1 = gα, g′ = gβ and X = e(g, g)x.
Define the message space M = GT .
Then the PKG runs the non-interactive verifiable encryption algorithm from
[9]. The idea is to verifiably encrypt the master secret key α and β under the
public key X. This can be done as follows. Let N := poly(k) for some polynomial
poly(·), be a security parameter7. Let HE : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}N be a secure hash
function.
1. The PKG randomly selects uj , u′j ∈R Zp and computes (Tj = guj , T ′j = gu
′
j ),
for j = 1 to N .
2. For j = 1 to N the PKG computes the following.
– Compute Zj,0 = uj , Zj,1 = uj − α, Z ′j,0 = u′j , Z ′j,1 = u′j − β.
– Randomly select vj,0, vj,1, v′j,0, v
′
j,1 ∈R Zp, compute E0,j,i = Xvj,i ⊕
Zj,i, E1,j,i = gvj,i and E′0,j,i = X
v′j,i ⊕ Z ′j,i, E′1,j,i = gv
′
j,i for i ∈ {0, 1}8.
3. PKG computes L = HE( T1|| E0,1,0|| E1,1,0|| E0,1,1|| E1,1,1|| . . . || TN ||
E0,N,0|| E1,N,0|| E0,N,1|| E1,N,1) and L′ = HE( T ′1|| E′0,1,0|| E′1,1,0|| E′0,1,1||
E′1,1,1|| . . . || T ′N || E′0,N,0|| E′1,N,0|| E′0,N,1|| E′1,N,1). Let bj , b′j be the j-th bit
of L and L′ respectively.
4. Output T = {
(















7 N controls the cheating probability of the verifiable encryption.
8 We assume that some appropriate padding has been added for the ⊕ operation.
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5. Verification. Anyone can check if T is a valid encryption of α and β under the
public key X by computing L and L′ from T and checking if the following
equations hold:
E0,j,bj























where j = 1 to N and bj , b′j are the j-th bit of L and L
′ respectively.
The public parameters mpk and master secret key msk are given by
mpk = (g, g1, g′, h1, h2, h3, X,H, HI ,Ht,M, T ) msk = (α, β, gx)
Extract Protocol: On input the master public key/secret key pair (mpk, msk) and
an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k of a user U , the PKG carries out an interactive protocol
with U , as follows. Compute ID = HI(ID). If ID = α, it aborts. Otherwise, the
protocol proceeds as follow:
1. The user U selects a random r ∈R Zp and sends R = hr1 to the PKG.
2. U gives to the PKG the following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
PK{r : R = hr1}
3. The PKG randomly selects r′, rID,2, rID,3 ∈ Zp and computes
h′ID = (Rg





hID,2 = (h2g−rID,2)1/(α−ID) hID,3 = (h3g−rID,3)1/(α−ID)
and sends (r′, h′ID, tID, rID,2, hID,2, rID,3, hID,3) to U .
4. The PKG computes πID, the non-interactive proof statement of the following
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
πID = PK
{











and sends to U .
5. After checking πID, U computes
rID,1 = r′/r hID,1 = (h′ID)
1/r
The secret key uskID is (r, rID,1, hID,1, rID,2, hID,2, rID,3, hID,3, tID, πID) where
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SanityCheck: On input (mpk, uskID) and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k, compute ID =
HI(ID) and check whether e(hID,i, g1/gID) = e(hig−rID,i , g) for i = 1, 2, 3. Also
check whether πID is a valid proof statement. If all of them are correct, output
1. Otherwise, output 0.
Enc: To encrypt a message m ∈ GT using identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k, compute ID =
HI(ID), generate a random s ∈R Zp and output the ciphertext C where:




−sID , e(g, g)s , m · e(g, h1)−s , e(g, h2)se(g, h3)sγ , πC
)
where γ = H(C1, C2, C3) and πC is a non-interactive proof statement of the
following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
πC = PK
{
(s) : C1 =
(
g1g
−ID)s ∧ C2 = e(g, g)s }
Dec: To decrypt a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) using secret key uskID,
compute γ = H(C1, C2, C3) and test whether
C4 = e(C1, hID,2hID,3γ) · C2rID,2+rID,3γ
If it is not equal or πC is not a valid proof statement , output ⊥. Else output
m = C3 · e(C1, hID,1) · C2rID,1
Trace: On input (mpk, ID, uskID), define family space FID = Zp. Parse uskID = (r,
rID,1, hID,1, rID,2, hID,2, rID,3, hID,3, tID, πID) and output the decryption key family
number fnID = rID,1.
Retrieve: On input (mpk, ID) and two sets of secret key (uskID, ũskID) for the
same identity ID,
1. Compute ID = HI(ID) and parse uskID = (r, rID,1, hID,1, rID,2, hID,2, rID,3,
hID,3, tID, πID) and ũskID = (r̃, r̃ID,1, h̃ID,1, r̃ID,2, h̃ID,2, r̃ID,3, h̃ID,3, t̃ID, π̃ID)
2. Compute K := Ht(hr1, rrID,1) and K̃ := Ht(h
r̃
1, r̃r̃ID,1). If K = K̃, output ⊥.
Otherwise, compute ( tIDK̃
t̃KID
) 1
K̃−K = gx (1)
and check whether X ?= e(g, gx). If not, output ⊥.
3. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, one can get
(
Tj , Zj,bj , E0,j,1−bj , E1,j,1−bj
)
in T (the
verifiable encryption in Setup). For simplicity, we omit the subscript j. That
is, one can get (T := gu, Zb, E0,1−b, E1,1−b := gv1−b), such that b ∈ {0, 1}
where
Zb = u− bα (2)
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Compute e(E1,1−b, gx)⊕ E0,1−b to get
Z1−b = u− (1− b)α (3)
From equation (2) and (3), compute α. Check whether g1
?= gα. If not,
use another j ∈ {1, . . . , N} to compute α. If all j’s have been used and no
equality is attained, output ⊥. Otherwise, compute β in the similar way and
output (α, β, gx) as msk.
5.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 2. The advantage of an adversary in the IND-ID-CCA game is negligi-
ble for the proposed scheme under the decisional truncated q-ABDHE assumption
in the random oracle model.
Proof: (sketch) The proof in our setting very much falls along the lines of the
proof of IND-ID-CCA security of Goyal’s scheme [4]. Here we just give a sketch
highlighting the differences.
The differences between [4] and our scheme (in terms of IND-ID-CCA) are
the formation of public parameter and the generation of a decryption key. In our
scheme, mpk = (g, g1, g′, h1, h2, h3, X,H,Ht,HI , ,M, T ) where (g, g1, h1, h2, h3,M)
are generated in the same way as in [4]. The remaining parameters are gen-
erated as follows. The simulator S randomly generates x, β ∈R Zp and sets
g′ = gβ , X = e(g, g)x. S also moderates the hash functions H,HI ,Ht as random
oracles. By controlling the random oracles, S can easily simulate the transcript
T .
In the Extraction Oracle, we use the same technique as in [4] to extract r
from the user and set r′ = rrID,1. S can generate tID easily, as it knows x, β.
S can also simulate the transcript xID by controlling the random oracle. ut
Theorem 3. The advantage of an adversary in the FindKey game is negligible
for the proposed scheme if the discrete log problem in G is hard.
Proof: The proof follows along the lines of the proof for the FindKey game in [4],
except that we are in the adaptive chosen identity attack model.
Let A denote a PPT algorithm that has a non-negligible advantage ε in
winning the FindKey game, we construct another PPT algorithm B that breaks
the discrete log assumption in G with a non-negligible probability. B proceeds
as follows.
B runs the algorithmA and gets the public parameters mpk = (g, g1, g′, h1, h2,
h3, X,H, HI ,Ht,M, T ). B pass h1 to its challenger and gets a challenge R ∈ G.
B’s goal is to find r def= logh1 R.
Assume adversary A makes at most qI extract queries, after getting a chal-
lenge R from the challenger, B selects i R← {1, 2, 3, ..., qI}. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ qI , if
j = i, B sets Rj = R, otherwise, B randomly selects rj ∈ Zp and sets Rj = h
rj
1 .
B answers A’s queries as follows:
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- Extract queries. When A performs an extract query on an identity IDj , B
rejects the query if IDj has already been created. Otherwise, B performs the
extract protocol as follows: if j 6= i, B runs the extract protocol as usual;
if j = i, B gives R to A together with a zero-knowledge proof. The zero-
knowledge proof is generated by rewinding A. Note that here we require
A to commit to the challenge before the zero-knowledge proof is carried
out so that when rewinding A the same challenge will be used by A. In
this way, B is able to simulate a proof by running the simulator of the
zero knowledge proof system without the knowledge of r. After receiving
(r′, h′IDi , t
′
IDi , rIDi,2, hIDi,2, rIDi,3, hIDi,3) and πIDi from A, B verifies πIDi and
runs a key sanity check by testing if e(hIDi,t, g1/g
IDi) = e(htg−rIDi,t , g) for
t = 2, 3. For t = 1, B tests if e(h′IDi , g1/g
IDi) = e(Rig−r
′
, g). If any of these
tests fails, B aborts with failure, otherwise, IDi is added to L1, notice that
B cannot derive the final user secret key uskIDi in this case.
- Corruption queries. When A performs a corruption query on identity ˆID, if
ˆID ∈ L1:
(a) ˆID = IDi, B aborts with failure
(b) ˆID 6= IDi, B returns uskÎD to A
otherwise, B rejects the query.
Finally, if B does not abort the game, with probability ε, A will output a
decryption key (passing the key sanity check) usk′IDn which has the same family
number with uskIDn in L1. If n = i, then B can calculate r = r′/f ′nIDi where f
′
nIDi
is the key family number of usk′IDi . It is obvious that n = i implies that uskIDi is
in L1 and B does not abort in the game. Since i is randomly chosen, B’s success
probability in solving the discrete log problem in G is at least εqI . ut
Theorem 4. The advantage of an adversary in the SanityCheck game is negli-
gible for the proposed scheme.
Proof: (sketch) Let the output of A be mpk, ID∗, C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5),
uskID∗ = {r, rID,1, rID,2, rID,3, hID,1, hID,2, hID,3, tID, πID} and ũskID∗ = {r̃, r̃ID,1,
r̃ID,2, r̃ID,3, h̃ID,1, h̃ID,2, h̃ID,3, t̃ID, π̃ID}. A wins implies that condition (1) - (5)
defined in section 4.2 are all fulfilled.
Condition (1) implies
e(hID,i, g1/gID) = e(hig−rID,i , g)
⇒ e(hID,i, gα−ID) = e(hig−rID,i , g)
⇒ e((hID,i)α−ID, g) = e(hig−rID,i , g)
⇒ (hID,i)α−ID = (hig−rID,i)
⇒ hID,i = (hig−rID,i)
1
α−ID for i = 1, 2, 3 (4)
Similarly, condition (2) implies
h̃ID,i = (hig−r̃ID,i)
1
α−ID for i = 1, 2, 3 (5)
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Condition (3) and (4) imply that C5 verifies (that is, C5 is a valid SPK). That
is, in the random oracle model, the simulator can extract s such that
C1 = (gα−ID)s and C2 = e(g, g)s (6)
Condition (5) implies that
C3 · e(C1, hID,1) · C2rID,1 6= C3 · e(C1, h̃ID,1) · C2r̃ID,1 (7)
We have
LHS = C3 · e(C1, hID,1) · C2rID,1






· e(g, g)s·rID,1 from equation (4) and (6)
= C3 · e(gs, h1g−rID,1) · e(g, g)s·rID,1
= C3 · e(g, h1)s · e(g, g)s·(−rID,1) · e(g, g)s·rID,1
= C3 · e(g, h1)s
Similarly we have
RHS = C3 · e(C1, h̃ID,1) · C2r̃ID,1
= C3 · e(g, h1)s = LHS (8)
However, equation (8) contradicts to equation (7). Thus A wins the game only
with negligible probability. ut
Theorem 5. The advantage of an adversary in the Retrievability game is negli-
gible for the proposed scheme.
Proof: (sketch) Let the output of A be mpk, ID∗, C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5),
uskID∗ = {r, rID,1, rID,2, rID,3, hID,1, hID,2, hID,3, tID, πID} and ũskID∗ = {r̃, r̃ID,1,
r̃ID,2, r̃ID,3, h̃ID,1, h̃ID,2, h̃ID,3, t̃ID, π̃ID} such that rID,1 6= r̃ID,1. A wins implies
that condition (1) - (4) defined in section 4.2 are all fulfilled.







K̃−K = gx. Condition (3) implies that rID,1 6= r̃ID1 , that is, K :=
Ht(gr, rID,1r) 6= K̃ := Ht(gr̃, r̃ID,1r̃). Condition (4) implies that either
1. K 6= K̃; or
2. X 6= e(g, gx) where gx is computed from equation (1); or
3. g1 6= gα where α is computed from equation (2) and (3)
Case (1) happens with negligible probability, due to the collision resistance
property of the hash function Ht. Case (2) happens with negligible probability,
due to the soundness of SanityCheck which has been proven above. Case (3)
also happens with negligible probability, due to the security of the verifiable
encryption scheme [9].
Combining all cases, the adversary only has negligible advantage to win the
game. ut
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we firstly identified a security issue of Goyal’s work in [4,5]. We
then proposed a way to fix it. Then, we took one step further than Goyal’s work
by proposing a Traceable and Retrievable IBE. In our notion, the PKG’s mas-
ter secret key is retrieved automatically if more than one user secret key are
released. We presented a formal model to capture this idea, and proposed a con-
crete scheme based on Gentry’s IBE [3]. We believe that the model we proposed
in this paper may be more appealing in practice as our model encourages the
PKG to strengthen their security system. If someone can successfully release an
additional user secret key, it means that his security is also compromised.
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